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New Public Management reforms in local government 
All over Europe, local governments have been exposed to New Public Management (NPM) 
reforms. The basic idea of NPM is to make these local entities– and the responsible politicians! - 
much more businesslike; that is market-, performance-, cost-, efficiency-, audit- and output- 
oriented (Bochel & Bochel 2010, Diefenbach 2009, Pina et al. 2009). These reforms not only 
advocate administrative and legislative innovation, they also attribute a new role to local 
politicians by considering them as rational, goal steering, strategic and analytic thinkers (Steyvers 
et al. 2006). Politicians should provide guidance and define policies, deciding on priorities and 
setting targets (Steyvers et al. 2008, Liguori 2010).  
In particular the local politicians were pivotal players in bringing the NPM idea into real practice; 
they had to be willing to implement the reform from ‘the bottom to the top’, starting at 
operational level. Councillors’ closeness to the public, the services delivered and the 
policymaking might enhance their knowledge of NPM instruments (Steyvers et al. 2006, Steyvers 
et al. 2008, Moynihan & Pandey 2010). Their support gives “political weight” to the NPM tools 
and plays an important role in integrating them in decision-making (Tat Kei Ho 2005). 
Councillors in municipalities are therefore considered as political protagonists within their 
municipality and their actions may be used as an appropriate indicator for the results that NPM 
reforms hope to achieve (Bochel & Bochel 2010, Brugué & Vallès 2005).  
“What gets measured, gets done” 
The advocacy of calculation and quantification is fundamental in this NPM vision of local 
governance as results-orientated activity. Some even call it ‘measurement fever’, quoting 
Osborne and Gaebler (1993:146) “what gets measured gets done” (Diefenbach 2009, Moynihan 
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& Pandey 2010, Lapsley 1999). As a consequence, local politicians were increasingly exposed to 
quantitative and financial information for efficient control and monitoring of local government 
activities (Lapsley 1999, Askim 2007, Yetano 2009, Leroy 2011). A classic example is the 
addition of analytical financial information – often associated with accrual accounting- to the 
annual budget (Pina et al. 2009, ter Bogt et al. 2011).  
Politics by numbers ? 
Local government reformers expected that the new financial analytical information would 
influence the budget discussion within the council (Lapsley 1999). In contrast with the ‘old style’ 
when budget discussions were mainly input oriented, the new analytical financial information 
(e.g. information from balance sheet, debt evolution, …) with focus on effects and outcomes 
should improve the budget discussions and support better-informed decisions. The major 
difference between the ‘old style’ and the ‘new NPM style’ is that the ingredients evolved from 
regulation and input-oriented control to results or outcome oriented control (Schedler 2003, Pina 
et al. 2009).  
Research on politicians’ use of performance information in general showed that these 
expectations are –at least- contestable (ter Bogt, 2004, see also ter Bogt et al., 2011). Concerning 
use of financial information, various factors explain why politicians only show a limited interest: 
the complexity of local government, unclear role distinction amongst politicians and 
administrators, different time horizons and politicians' negative perception of the information 
((Yetano 2009, Pollitt & Bouckaert 2000, ter Bogt 2004, Johnsen & Vakkuri 2010, Van Dooren 
et al. 2010, Van Dooren & Van de Walle 2008, Van Thiel & Leeuw 2002, Hansen 2001, Liguori 
2010, Steyvers et al. 2006, Schedler 2003, Van Hengel et al. 2010, Tat-Kei Ho 2005). Although, 
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these rather negative findings are nuanced by Askim’s (2007) survey research on Danish 
councillors showing higher levels of utilization at operational level.  
Regarding their behaviour, some authors (e.g. Ter Bogt 2001, 2004, Schedler 2003) revealed the 
existence of competing rationalities between the irrational political and the rational NPM 
thinking, the so called ‘irrationality of rationality’, causing disappointing results regarding the 
impact of NPM reforms on politicians’ acting (Bochel & Bochel 2010, Lapsley & Pallot 2000, 
Lapsley 1999, 2009). Some even identify ‘its lack of understanding for political processes and 
things political’ as the most fundamental problem of the NPM-movement (Steyvers et al. 2006). 
The unpredictable nature of political decision-making is criticized as irrational and inefficient 
from this rational NPM logic. However, if NPM became totally senseless for political rationality 
than this could be a major obstacle for the successful implementation of many NPM projects in 
Europe (Schedler 2003).  
Therefore, reformers, often the legislator, understood that in order to succeed, they had to get the 
use and benefits of this financial analytical information inside the political world in a way that 
politicians would pick up the ball in their behaviour (Lapsley & Pallot 2000, Schedler 2003, 
Bochel & Bochel 2010, Schedler). In other words, councillors had to be willing to behave 
differently as politicians by using rational, objective and focused information for control and 
monitoring of municipal activities (Windels & Christiaens 2006).   
Many studies show that it is still not clear today how much of NPM tools such as financial 
analytical information has been absorbed in practice by politicians all over the world (Schedler 
2003, Askim 2007). Most evidence on politicians’ utilization of financial information is rather 
anecdotal and stems from case studies or survey material. They have provided valuable insight 
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and interesting hypotheses but little systematic evidence of levels and patterns of use (Askim 
2007, Steyvers et al. 2006, Verhelst et al. 2011).  We have far less knowledge about politicians’ 
than about managers’ behaviour. Moreover, it is not evident that findings concerning managerial 
use apply to politicians as they conduct their work in very different ways (Askim 2008, Lee 2008, 
Liguori et al. 2009). Literature often only focuses on executive politicians and mostly takes a 
qualitative approach (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008, Verhelst et al. 2011). In general, scientists in the 
domain of political and social sciences show a certain restraint to study the use of management 
tools. They rather stress the individual profile of councillors, (Steyvers et al. 2006, Guérin & 
Kerrouche 2008, Verhelst et al. 2011). They tend to reveal attitudinal effects, but do not examine 
real behaviour (De Groot et al. 2010). Vice versa, apart from a few notable exceptions (authors 
such as Askim, Van Helden and ter Bogt) accounting researchers are reluctant to investigate 
accounting topics with politicians as research object.  
Moreover, the available studies primarily focus on why elected politicians are hesitant to use 
specific information in the budgetary cycle. They describe the bargaining process, institutional 
effects on the budget outcome and the impact of numerical and procedural constraints on the 
budget process (Blom-Hansen 2002). However, the enactment itself, when the budget has to be 
approved in the council largely remains uncovered. There have been some studies related to 
specific initiatives, for example, Frisco and Stalebrink (2008) analysed U.S. Congressional use of 
performance information and concluded that “we know little whether legislators discuss or 
dismiss PART (program assessment rating tool), or are even aware of its existence”. Melkers & 
Willoughby (2005) investigated budgeting practices at state level but these results are not 
transferable to the local level which might show a different use pattern due to the closeness of 
local politicians to budget negotiations.  
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This means that we still know little about how much financial analytical information local 
politicians use for decision-making. Researchers only occasionally investigate the use of financial 
information for political purposes. Moreover, they mainly cover executive politicians’ attitudes 
and focus on the availability of information. The key question remains if the ‘average’ councillor 
is able to perceive the new financial information as relevant and thus to use it adequately for 
political decision-making. This is the principal aim of the introduction of financial analytical 
information in local government.  
Financial analytical information as arguments in budget debate 
Any comprehensive investigation of real use in practice of financial analytical information, 
should focus on councillors’ real behaviour as elected representatives (Lounsbury 2008, Lowndes 
& Leach 2004, Lounsbury 2008, Lapsley 2009). Therefore this research goes ‘one dimension 
further’ than for example the study of NPM elements as found in electoral programmes (Fattore 
et al. 2012). It attempts to investigate real practice. The annual budget debate offers promising 
perspectives to study the use of financial analytical information when ‘politicians act as 
politicians’ (Melkers & Willoughby (2005). 
From both a political and a managerial perspective the budget is of paramount importance. It is 
the main document on which the council bases political decisions whether a traditional budgeting 
and accounting system or an accrual system is used (Adam & Behm 2006). Because rhetoric is an 
essential element of political communication, the debate reflects how local politicians really 
behave and argue in the council. As a political act, the budget forms the basis for negotiation and 
plays a central role in the (generally incremental) allocation of resources among different political 
programs and purposes (Blom-Hansen 2002, Liguori et al. 2009). It reflects the strategic policy 
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options and shows how resources will be obtained and spent. The annual budget discussion is 
usually quite intense because it relates to the municipalities’ strategic long term planning with 
important financial implications (Frisco & Stalebrink 2008). This is confirmed by Frisco and 
Stalebrink (2008) who analyzed the congressional committee reports for containing PART 
(Program Assessment Rating Tool) related content. The Budget Committee showed a more 
intensive use of PART ; 31% of all the congressional hearings related to budgeting.  
Certainly in local government, the smaller albeit more direct nature of government means that a 
wider range of councillors may be able to comment knowledgeably on the budget (Melkers & 
Willoughby 2005). Therefore, the budget debate is an appropriate moment to assess the real use 
of financial analytical information in political practice, when councillors argue and behave as 
politicians. 
Research question  
This study aims to assess two questions currently under debate. Firstly, to reveal the extent to 
which councillors refer to strategic financial and analytical information for their argumentation in 
the budget debate and secondly, to uncover the determinants that influence this presence in the 
council debate. This combination of a political (that is, ideology, power,…) and a NPM (that is, 
analytical financial information) dimension, is rather innovative.  
Firstly, we attempt to evaluate if councillors refer to strategic analytical financial information as 
arguments in the budget discussion as suggested by the NPM reformers. Secondly, which factors 
determine the presence of financial analytical information in the budget debate? There is 
extensive evidence that municipal conditions, governance structure, together with the 
characteristics and capabilities of the councillors themselves influence financial and accounting 
conditions (Giroux & Mc Lelland 2003, Brugué & Valles 2005). Therefore, as documented in 
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table 1, the following section will discuss three hypotheses on the impact of the political context 
in the municipality, the individual characteristics of council party leaders or their NPM 
knowledge on the presence of financial analytical information in the budget debate.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: the political context of municipalities influences the budget debate. 
The first hypothesis concerns the political context in the municipalities. The budget cannot be 
disentangled from the political system, some even call it ‘an expression of the political system’ 
(Blom-Hansen 2002, Liguori et al. 2009). Indeed, the specific political environment in which 
politicians operate is expected to influence their behaviour in the council (Steyvers et al. 2008, 
Greasly & John 2010). The strength of the majority can be expected to determine the debate in 
the council (Solé-Ollé 2006). Views differ on how it affects the discussion of the budget. Askim 
(2008) states that a small majority creates greater risks that badly performing parties will lose 
power and it generates more competition between the parties. This high-competition environment 
is most promising for discussion. Risks stimulate parties in power to improve their performance 
and they use the budget discussion as an improvement strategy. Neutral, numerical and financial 
information may untangle decision-processes that have stalled due to fierce ideological, inter-
party or interpersonal difference (Askim 2008). Others hold that low competition encourages 
discussion, because it facilitates fact-oriented discussions.  
Public budgeting is a bargaining process between different coalition partners (Blom-Hansen 
2002). Competition can be considered high when many parties are represented in the polity and 
when political blocks are equal in size (Askim 2008). This means that coalitions generate more 
discussion as different standpoints have to be reconciled. Goeminne et al. (2008) also argued that 
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more fragmentation leads to more discussion. Coalition governments tend to break down and 
complicate command and control mechanisms, they may dilute the coherence of policy delivery 
(Greasly & John 2010). We will assume that the more parties in government, the higher the 
debate score. 
Besides the political conflict level in the municipality, some characteristics of the council itself 
might impact on the debate. Firstly, the presence of a special municipal council commission for 
financial affairs refers to a more professional organization and more commitment and 
engagement with the budget. Secondly, a more impartial council chair from outside the College 
of Mayor and Aldermen is expected to stimulate discussion and to show a more neutral and open 
attitude to the budget proposal of the College (pretesting information, Suykens 2010).  
Hypothesis 2: Individual characteristics of local council party leaders influence the budget 
debate . 
Skills and capabilities of councillors could also influence the budget discussion (Bochel & 
Bochel 2010, Verhelst et al. 2011). Given the relatively large number of councillors (7.464 in 
total for 2012 ), not everybody can be heard as much in the discussion. Therefore, we focused on 
the key members, the so called front benchers in the council, being the local party leaders in the 
council. (Askim 2007, Bochel & Bochel 2010). Their position provides room for strong minded 
individuals to exploit their role if they choose so (Bochel & Bochel 2010). Consequently, the 
hypotheses concerning the individual characteristics of councillors are tested on local party 
leaders (Verhelst et al. 2011). Councillors are in general increasingly highly educated and 
involved in local politics for a greater length of time (Guérin & Kerrouche 2008). However, there 
is contradiction in literature concerning the influence of education on the use of financial 
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information. The explanation usually offered is that people with advanced degrees and training 
are skilled at handling large amounts of formal, numerical or technical information. But Askim 
(2008) found that utilization of performance information is lowest among the best educated 
councillors because councillors will seek and emphasize performance information when they are 
unsure what to do, the best educated already possess the knowledge needed to make decisions 
(Askim 2008).  
Concerning their political experience, results are again inconclusive. Some argue that highly 
experienced politicians have better abilities to interpret and make use of financial information. 
They are more efficient readers of large volumes budget documents and hence they can more 
efficiently interpret information (Askim 2008). In contrast, Melkers & Willoughby (2005) found 
that performance information usage decreased with experience. Inexperienced councillors were 
more receptive and more insecure than political veterans. De Groot et al. (2010) confirm this two 
rival suppositions, more experienced members tend to be more open-minded, but long-tenured 
members rely on routine and familiar information sources.  
Thirdly and closely related to experience is their combination of other political mandates. Due 
to their broad networks within and outside the political body, ‘cumulating politicians’ are better 
positioned than less experienced to interpret financial information by comparing it against 
previous trends and working with other organizations (Askim 2008). During the federal (national) 
elections of 2007, 60% of the candidates held a local mandate, from which 40,4% were 
councillors. Of the final elected members of parliament, 70,8% occupied a local mandate of 
which councillors counted for 46% (Weekers et al. 2007).  
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Hypothesis 3: local party leaders’ knowledge concerning NPM influences the budget 
debate. 
The third and final hypothesis concerns council party leaders’ knowledge of NPM concepts and 
tools introduced by the Flemish local government act, we could label it the ‘applied part of NPM’ 
in Flemish municipalities. We could indeed presume that councillors’ usage of financial 
analytical information might be explained by a more comprehensive knowledge of NPM 
concepts and tools (Hood 1995, Askim 2007, 2008). Indeed, a more businesslike attitude and  a 
certain predisposition for control and monitoring instruments is expected to improve the budget 
debate score (Steyvers et al. 2006). Based the NPM paradigm as conceptualized by Hood (1995) 
and on interviews with Flemish field experts we selected five relevant concepts (municipal 
management team, management control and policy cycle, internal control, autonomization and 
budget ownership) to assess party leaders’ knowledge of NPM implementation in their 
municipality (Leroy 2011). We could label this the applied part of the Flemish local NPM 
regulation. We expect that local party leaders’ knowledge of applied NPM concepts 
increases the budget debate score.  
Control variables 
In addition we control for possible interfering factors, the first being the overall debate culture of 
each municipality. Some have a tradition of open dialogue while others support a more closed 
consultative model. While in certain councils the budget discussion starts with a detailed 
clarification at the beginning of the meeting, in others there is no introduction at all. An elaborate 
explanation of the budget proposal demonstrates an  appreciation for discussion and an openness 
towards comments. Secondly, the social and economic profile (size, population characteristics, 
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province, income, economic health, …) of the municipality might influence the budgetary 
process (Blom-Hansen 2002, Verhelst et al. 2011). Thirdly, we check for professionalization of 
the municipality, if the budget is approved on time, this indicates that the municipality is 
efficiently organized and that the political negations went off smoothly. 
Flanders as empirical setting 
The Flemish case offers a favourable environment for this kind of study. Flemish municipalities 
were subject to similar NPM reforms as elsewhere in Western Europe (Windels 2006). In 2002, 
the Belgian authority over local entities was regionalized, as a consequence Flanders and the 
Walloon provinces followed a different reform track. Every Belgian region (the Flemish, the 
Walloon and the Brussels region) now has its own Local Government Act (LGA). The Flemish 
LGA is the most innovative one. Fitting with NPM, attention was given to a more businesslike 
and professionalized management of local government. The reform relates to aspects such as 
organizational culture, financial management, control, audit, human resources and result oriented 
policy planning and evaluation.  
Flanders has 308 municipalities, covering between 80 and 480.000 inhabitants. They hold a 
threefold structure with a council, an executive and a mayor. The council is chosen through direct 
elections every six years and has the competence to fix the budget and proclaim municipal 
regulations. Dependent on the number of inhabitants, they count between 7 and 55 members. 
Most Flemish councillors have ordinary jobs and are only part-time politicians. The local 
councillor without an executive mandate spends an average of 7.63 hours per week on his task as 
councillor and this for a very limited monetary compensation (Reynaert et al. 2010).  
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The members of the executive (the College of Mayor and Aldermen) are elected by and among 
the council members, mostly as a result of a coalition agreement.  The College consists of 2 to 10 
members, they are in charge of day-to-day management and are presided by the mayor who 
actually is the real leader at local level (Goeminne et al. 2008, Valcke 2009). Local power 
(nearly) completely rests in the hands of the parties holding a majority position in the local 
council. This means that a multi party College reflects the absence of a clear majority in the 
council (Goeminne et al. 2008).  
Taxes, grants and funds are the most important sources of income. In Flanders, taxes (on personal 
income and on property) are the primary source of income (47,2 %). The own resources (benefits 
from activities or results of financial investments) amount to about 10% (Valcke 2009). There are 
very important differences concerning financial capacity and budget structure. While the average 
expense comes to €561 per inhabitant, the smallest budget accounts for 561 € and the largest € 
3.794, this is a proportion of 1 to 6. Another illustration; although taxes generate on average 
49,4% of the receipts, this varies from the minimum of 18,9% and the maximum of 71,9% (Dexia 
Bank 2007).  
Because of the principally mandatory character of the Flemish LGA, the context in which 
Flemish municipalities operate is largely homogeneous. This uniform empirical setting enhances 
the comparability of empirical findings (de Bruijn & van Helden 2006). Also, from a 
methodological point of view, a local-level context offers a number of advantages (Blom-Hansen 
2002). Unlike studies using country data, we are able to control for institutional aspects and 
economic conditions as municipalities have a homogeneous institutional context. Flemish 
municipalities share common political and institutional systems, experience common economic 
shocks, employ similar budgetary processes and have identical electoral rules. A final advantage 
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of a data-set at the local level is related to the number of cross- sections. Municipal data allow 
testing models with a much larger number of observations (Blom-Hansen 2002,  Goeminne & 
Smolders 2010). 
Budgeting practice in Flemish municipalities 
Until the mid-1990s, the financial management of the Flemish municipalities was, similarly to 
that of local governments in many other countries, traditionally highly input oriented, i.e. 
organizations were controlled on the basis of financial budgets and administrative procedures. 
Before 1995, Flemish municipalities’ accounting was based on the budgetary model and 
primarily intended to limit spending. The adopted bases of accounting were commitment and 
cash. Budgeting was viewed as the only relevant phase of the accounting cycle, while year-end 
financial reports were virtually neglected. Bookkeeping was based on the single-entry system, 
which emphasized budgetary compliance. In 1995 the traditional cameral accounting system was 
transformed into a system towards businesslike accrual accounting (Windels 2006). Today local 
councillors are provided the financial and policy information to fulfil their goal steering and 
monitoring tasks (Leroy 2011).  
The preparation of the annual budget generally follows the same procedure. Prior to the fiscal 
year (parallel with the civil year), a budget needs to be agreed upon. To this end, each 
municipality’s financial department sets up a budget draft in August or September. This draft is 
discussed by the College of Mayor and Aldermen and the proposed budget that develops from 
these discussions is brought before the local council for ratification. In principle, this takes place 
on the first Monday of October (although only few municipalities actually meet the deadline). 
This council meeting is considered as the most important one of the year. Only when the budget 
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is endorsed before December 31, it can be executed (Goeminne et al. 2008). The precise role of 
the various actors involved in this budgeting process cannot easily be put into general terms. 
Legally, there is only the stipulation that the presentation of the budget is a responsibility of the 
College. Still, this does not mean that the College also technically sets up the budget. Indeed, in 
most of the cases the College is supported by the finance department of the municipality 
(Goeminne et al. 2008). Important for our purpose is that some municipalities set up special 
finance commissions to previously discuss the (technical aspects) of the budget proposal. 
However, based on our pretesting information we know that, because of its public character, the 
most important discussion takes place in the plenary council meeting (Olislagers & Ackaert 
2010). 
Method 
This study attempts to investigate the use of financial analytical information in real political 
practice. The literal dialogue of the budget debate is the closest we can get to how politicians 
really behave in practice and how they use financial analytical information. Our approach is 
informed by discourse analysis, becoming increasingly widely used in the social sciences, 
including political science (Fattore et al. 2012, Bochel & Bochel 2010). Every transcription of the 
discussion is carefully analysed for containing references to financial analytical information. We 
could consider it as content analysis on political discourse. 
We score the councillors’ interpellations during the budget debate (plenary council meeting) on 
the presence of arguments containing financial analytical information. The interpellations from 
councilors (not the executive politicians) that contain one of the 12 elements referring to 
analytical financial information are analyzed. An interpellation is considered as a group of 
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sentences containing a comment with argumentation. The interpellation usually ends with a reply 
from an executive politician (mayor or alderman). The study is limited to the interpellation by 
councilors, the replies by executive politicians are not taken into account. Firstly because we 
want to assess the ‘average’ councilors’ use of financial information, secondly because this 
would imply a double count of certain elements as executive politicians would respond referring 
to the (already counted) interpellation. Each discussion is scrutinized for containing references to 
12 elements directly referring to the applied part of NPM in Flemish municipalities. Table 2 gives 
a comprehensive overview of the elements constructing the budget debate score. 
Data 
We collect our basic data and documentary evidence from a copy of the council’s meeting where 
the budget for 2011 is discussed (see figure 1). In addition, some data can only be acquired 
efficiently by asking the councillors themselves. This part could be called a limited survey, 
elaborated by means of a small online questionnaire. Furthermore, some municipal archival data 
stemming from secondary sources (i.e. Flemish agency for interior affairs) are collected. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Agenda item : approval 
draft budget 2011 
Official reports with literal 
notification of the discussion 
Debate in the council 
Dialogue and reference to 
numerical, financial and 
quantitative information 
Final decision = 
voting 
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Our sample represents almost half of the Flemish municipalities. We use data on 121 
municipalities, based on a stratified random sample following a generally accepted detailed 
clustering of municipalities, taking into account some 150 socio-economic factors (Dexia Bank 
Belgium 2007).  
Analysis 
The dependent variable: budget debate score 
A budget debate score, measuring councillors’ reference to financial analytical information is 
constructed. This approach is rather similar to the so called management or accounting index 
(Christiaens 1999, Windels 2006) or the disclosure index used by Pina et al. (2009). The presence 
of financial analytical information during the budget debate is measured by scoring the 
argumentation in the budget debate on twelve representative items to assess the presence of 
financial analytical information. The total budget debate score varies between 0 and 82, with a 
(low) mean of 13 (figure 2). A more representative picture, taking the size of the municipality 
into account (budget debate score divided by the number of councillors), presents scores varying 
between 0 and 2.92 with a mean of 0,5. 
Figure 2 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
detail_budget_score_total_councilors 121 ,00 2,92 ,5033 
score_debate_detail 121 ,00 82,00 13,0083 
  
   
 
This means that councillors only limitedly refer to analytical financial information during the 
budget debate. To the question to what extent the average councillor use financial analytical 
information, we should answer, based on our data, that this is, in real practice, only to a limited 
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extent. This seems in line with the expectations of research concerning the use of performance 
information. It might be that councillors still argue in what we call ‘the old style’ with mainly 
input oriented argumentation. Otherwise there could just be little discussion about the budget, 
although this is not supported by the numbers in figure 3. The mean of 0,4 for the number of 
interpellations divided by the number of councillors suggests that on average during the budget 
debate there are as much interpellations as half of the number of councillors. 
Figure 3 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
number of interpellations/number of 
councilors 
121 ,000 2,952 ,41868 
     
     
  
   
 
 
However, the scores and frequencies of the 12 distinctive elements, (figure 4 and 5), reveal that 
interpellations referring to debt or evolution of debt ratio, evolution of specific costs such as 
personnel expenses, transfers to other municipal organizations, strategic policy plans and 
comparisons with financial data from previous budgets or prognoses are clearly more frequent in 
the budget debate.  
 
Figure 4 (scores/councillors) N Minimum Maximum Mean 
detail_budget_score_total_councilors 121 ,00 2,92 ,5033 
ref_strat_plan_councillors 121 ,00 ,59 ,0575 
ref_balance_councillors 121 ,00 ,16 ,0116 
profit_loss_councillors 121 ,00 ,24 ,0297 
debt_councillors 121 ,00 ,59 ,0577 
cost_evolution_councillors 121 ,00 1,12 ,0593 
cashflow_councillors 121 ,00 ,17 ,0091 
reserve_councillors 121 ,00 ,40 ,0287 
time_councillors 121 ,00 ,81 ,1207 
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error_councillors 121 ,00 ,19 ,0141 
amendment_councillors 121 ,00 1,08 ,0201 
separate_art_councillors 121 ,00 2,00 ,0322 
transfers_councillors 121 ,00 ,48 ,0625 
  
   
 
Figure 5 (total scores) N Minimum Maximum Mean 
dep_detail_ref_strat_plan 121 ,00 16,00 1,4793 
dep_detail_balance 121 ,00 4,00 ,2893 
dep_detail_profit_loss 121 ,00 6,00 ,7851 
dep_detail_analysis_debt 121 ,00 16,00 1,4793 
dep_detail_financial_analysis_e
volution_costs 
121 ,00 28,00 1,5455 
dep_detail_financial_analysis_c
ashflow 
121 ,00 4,00 ,2149 
dep_detail_reserve 121 ,00 19,00 ,7934 
dep_detail_time_past_future 121 ,00 33,00 3,2066 
dep_detail_errors 121 ,00 4,00 ,3554 
dep_detail_amendment 121 ,00 27,00 ,4711 
dep_details_transfers 121 ,00 12,00 1,5455 
dep_detail_separate_articles 121 ,00 54,00 ,8430 
  
   
 
These financial items will probably be considered as more politically relevant. Maybe the NPM 
idea of ‘politicians using financial analytical information’ only applies when they perceive it as 
politically relevant ? Councillors seem to be willing to use financial analytical information, but 
only when it matches their political intentions. This might support the idea of ‘competing 
rationalities’ where  political rationality seems to predominate the NPM-like thinking. 
Consequently, we could expect that especially the political determinant of the debate score will 
have significant effect.  
The determinants of the budget debate score (to be completed) 
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In the following the hypotheses are subject to statistical testing using linear regression. The 
selected variables serve as predictors for a regression analysis (dependent variable=budget debate 
score/councillors) as shown in table 3. 
The first hypothesis that the specific political context of each municipality influences the budget 
debate score is not supported by the results of the statistical testing. In fact, none of the political 
context variables reveals any significant effect on the debate score. The innovation introduced by 
the Flemish local government act in the form of a council chair not belonging to the College and 
the installation of a special commission for financial affairs do not seem significant for 
interpreting the budget debate score. They do not stimulate councillors’ attention for financial 
analytical information. The conflict level measured by the number of parties in government and 
the strength of the majority neither have any significant impact on the budget debate score. This 
is rather surprising, given the dominance of political parties in the budgetary process and the 
presumed impact of the political context on the budget debate score. 
In the second hypothesis concerning the individual profile of party leaders, only the professional 
use of financial information is significant (p= 0,083), although not at the 0,05 level. Indeed, it is 
very plausible that councillors working with financial analytical information for professional 
reasons would have a usage and knowledge advantage. Other predictors such as education, 
multiple office holding and experience are not significant. This cannot easily be explained and 
certainly requires further research.  
The results of testing the third hypothesis reveal that, as expected, party leaders’ knowledge of 
applied NPM concepts in Flemish municipalities’ enhances argumentation with financial 
analytical information in the budget debate. Although we should bear in mind that the overall 
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reference to financial analytical information is rather low, this is encouraging for reformers as 
this was their principal purpose. The various initiatives of legislators to familiarize councillors 
with the NPM discourse seems to be fruitful for achieving the expected strategic and analytical 
attitude in the council. 
Concerning the control variables, the ‘debate culture’ measured by the ratio of the total number 
of interpellations during the budget debate in relation to the total number of councillors has a 
significant effect. This illustrates that the debate traditions and habits in the council are certainly 
not irrelevant for explaining the use of financial analytical information. Many interpellations and 
intense discussion in the council enhances the argumentation with financial analytical 
information. The socio-economic profile and the professionalization level of the municipality 
have no significant effect.  
Conclusion (to be completed) 
All over Europe municipalities are being reformed in a businesslike manner. One of the crucial 
elements is the introduction of financial analytical information in the council. Councillors should 
behave differently as goal-steering policy makers, using the new supplied information. But this is 
theory. Already in the early days of the NPM movement, scholars cautioned for disappointing 
results concerning the impact of reforms on political behaviour. But what can we learn from 
actual political practice during the budget debate? The use of financial analytical information is 
in general very limited, but politically relevant elements will be used as arguments. This suggests 
a predominance of political over –rational- NPM thinking. We could conclude that councillors 
still need to be entirely convinced of the political advantages of this type of information for 
decision-making. In spite of this, use for professional reasons of financial analytical information 
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and party leaders’ knowledge of applied NPM concepts are significant determinants of the budget 
debate score. This is certainly very relevant and requires further research. This study also 
demonstrates how an underexplored method can be a useful instrument to assess politicians’ real 
behaviour. To our knowledge it is the first time that political debate has been used for such 
content analysis and this article is one of the few quantitative content analysis contributions. We 
show that the budget debate can provide highly relevant information to the field, reflecting 
presence of NPM concepts in society, complementing mainstream public administration research 
with a focus on politicians’ real use of financial analytical information for political purposes. 
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Table 1:  
(+) expected positive  impact or (–) negative impact on budget debate score) 
Hypothesis Variable Proxy Operationalization 
1. The specific political 
context in the 
municipality 
influences the debate  
Fragmentation of 
majority (+) 
Number of parties in 
coalition (Le Maux et 
al. 2011).  
Source: Flemish agency 
for interior affairs    
Number of parties in 
government  
 Strength of majority(+ 
or -) 
Scope of the majority 
 
Source: Flemish agency 
for interior affairs   
The difference between 
the percentage of the 
seats of the government 
parties in the council 
and 50% (Goeminne & 
Smolders 2010). 
 Special commission 
for financial affairs (+) 
Presence of commission 
or not 
Source: municipal 
website, official reports 
of the councils’ 
discussion concerning 
the budget 2011 
Dummy, commission or 
not 
 Chair of council not 
executive politician (+) 
Chair member of 
college or not ? 
Source: Flemish agency 
for interior affairs  
dummy variables, 
chairman College 
member or not 
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2. Individual 
characteristics of 
leading councillors 
determine the debate  
Educational 
background of party 
leaders in council (+ or 
-) 
Mean education level of 
council party leaders 
Source: survey party 
leaders council 
Mean of ‘education 
scores’ of party leaders 
in council (lowest score 
primary education, 
highest PhD), measured 
7 point likert scale 
 Combination of other 
political mandates by 
party leaders in 
council (+) 
 
Number of party leaders 
with other official 
political mandates 
 
Source: official 
publication in Belgian 
Bulletin of Acts, Orders 
and Decrees 
Dummy, at least one 
party leader has another 
political mandate 
 Political experience of 
party leaders in 
council (+ or -) 
Number of years in 
council 
Source: survey party 
leaders council 
Mean of years in 
council for council 
party leaders 
 Professional use of fin 
info (+) 
Use of financial 
information for 
professional reasons 
Source: survey party 
leaders council 
Dummy, use or not 
mean of scores council 
party leaders 
3. Knowledge of 
applied NPM concepts 
NPM knowledge of 
council party leaders 
Score on test of 
acquaintance with: 
Score on 5 point Likert 
scale for each item, 
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of leading councillors 
impacts on the debate  
(+) 1. budget controllership 
2. municipal 
management team 
3. autonomization 
4. management control 
and policy cycle 
5. internal control 
Source: survey party 
leaders council 
mean of party leaders’ 
score on 5 items 
 
 
Control variables 
 
 
 
Social and economic 
profile of municipality 
 
 
 
 
Debate culture 
   
Socio-economic cluster 
of municipality 
cluster of each 
municipality 
Source: Dexia Bank 
Belgium 2007  
Cluster, dummies 
Number of 
interpellations during 
entire council meeting 
where budget is 
discussed 
Count of interpellations 
Source: official reports 
of the councils’ 
discussion concerning 
the budget 2011 
Number of all 
interpellations/number 
of councillors 
Preceding  explanation detailed explanation at 
the start of the meeting, 
by the mayor or 
alderman for finance  
Source: official reports 
of the councils’ 
Dummy, explanation  or 
not 
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discussion concerning 
the budget 2011 
professionalization Timely approval the  month of 2010 or 
2011 in which the 
budget is endorsed 
Source: official reports 
of the councils’ 
discussion concerning 
the budget 2011 
 
Dummy (December 
2010 is reference). 
 
 
Table 2: Dependent Variable: budget debate score 
Dependent Variable: 
budget debate score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic financial 
analytical information 
 
Proxy : budget debate score 
composed of 12 different elements 
Source: official reports of the councils’ 
discussion concerning the budget 2011  
 
Operationalization: 
sum of frequency of each 
element/number of councillors 
 
 
 
 
Reference to as argument in discussion 
-1.Strategic plan   
- 2. Balance sheet 
- 3. P/L statement 
- 4. Debt rate 
- 5.  % of specific costs 
- 6. Cash flow 
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- 7. Reserve 
- 8. Numbers in previous budgets  
- 9. Mistakes, tangible errors in text 
- 10. Amendments to the budget 
proposal 
-11.  Transfers  
- 12. Request for separate approval of 
budget articles 
 
Table 3 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) ,225 ,109  2,069 ,041 
knowledge_NPM_mean -,020 ,010 -,146 -1,997 ,048 
use_fin_info_mean ,223 ,130 ,125 1,724 ,087 
number of 
interpellations/number of 
councilors 
,657 ,081 ,587 8,112 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: detail_budget_score_total_councilors 
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